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“Rhetoric is the art which seeks to capture in opportune 
moments that which is appropriate and attempts to 
suggest that which is possible.”1
INTRODUCTION
The two phrases most associated with the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Brown v. Board of Education2 have taken on 
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1. John Poulakos, Toward a Sophistic Definition of Rhetoric, in
CONTEMPORARY RHETORICAL THEORY: A READER 25, 26 (John Louis Lucaites et al. 
eds., 1999).  
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Orwellian meanings.3 Like the “Patriot Act” and “family values,” the 
original intention and meaning of the words have been obscured by 
the context and the history of their use. The color-blind Constitution
is a rationale for rejecting attempts to integrate public schools.4 No
one is able to proclaim without irony that an action will be taken 
with all deliberate speed.5
In this Article, these terms will be the vehicle for examining 
unanticipated consequences, particularly those associated with brief 
writing in the U.S. Supreme Court. The Article will make no 
recommendations for avoiding unanticipated consequences.6 Instead, 
                                                                                                               
2. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (Brown I) (“Separate 
educational facilities are inherently unequal.”); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 
294, 301 (1955) (Brown II) (“The[se] cases are remanded to the District Courts to 
take such proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion 
as are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially
nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these cases.”). 
3. GEORGE ORWELL, Politics and the English Language, in 4 THE 
COLLECTED ESSAYS, JOURNALISM AND LETTERS OF GEORGE ORWELL 127, 136 (Sonia 
Orwell & Ian Angos eds., 1968) (“In our time, political speech and writing are 
largely the defence of the indefensible. . . . Thus political language has to consist 
largely of euphemism, question-begging and sheer cloudy vagueness. Defenceless 
villages are bombarded from the air, the inhabitants driven out into the countryside, 
the cattle machine-gunned, the huts set on fire with incendiary bullets: this is 
called pacification.”).
4. Compare Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
551 U.S. 701, 726 (2007) (plurality opinion) (finding that racial balancing cannot be 
a legitimate state interest), with Jeffrey Rosen, The Color-Blind Court, 45 AM. U. L.
REV. 791, 792 (1996) (concluding that “the Fourteenth Amendment was not 
intended to forbid all racial discrimination in all circumstances, but instead to 
guarantee to all citizens a limited set of absolute civil rights”). 
5. See CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS 
ON THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 306 (1 ed. 2004):  
[T]he tragic lesson of the two decisions in Brown v. Board of Education is 
that one described an aspirational view of American democratic liberalism 
(Brown I) and the other (Brown II) actually defined the reality of grudging 
educational reform, and the power of racism as a barrier to true racial 
progress . . . . Whereas Brown I made possible the institutional equality 
first promised in 1776 with the Declaration of Independence . . . and again 
in 1865 with the ratification of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, Brown II created the method and manner in which America 
would resist the mandate of the quality ideal. 
6. See JACK GREENBERG, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: WITNESS TO A 
LANDMARK DECISION 4-5 (2004) (“Unanticipated obstacles arose, for example, 
southern opposition of a fierce intensity that had never been seen before, except 
perhaps in the resistance to Reconstruction. . . . The law of unforeseen consequences 
worked its powers with vigor. If campaign is the apt word [for the NAACP litigation 
campaign], then it alludes to armies that in unanticipated ways advance, retreat, stall, 
see-saw, meander, yet continue to move towards victory.”).
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my purpose is to articulate a principled approach for distinguishing 
among the unanticipated consequences of brief writing. My thesis is 
that some unanticipated consequences—for example, those 
associated with the Government’s friend of the court briefs filed in 
Brown I and Brown II and eventually with the term all deliberate 
speed7—are far more troublesome than others—in this case, those 
associated generally with the color-blind Constitution and 
specifically with the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund 
(NAACP) briefs filed on behalf of the schoolchildren in Brown and 
associated cases.8
While critiquing the brief writers’ rhetorical choices and 
argument strategies, I will try to avoid repetitive praise or criticism 
of the arguments made. Applying any critique to the much-studied 
briefs in Brown may be foolhardy, but perhaps the familiar, nearly 
mythical nature of the Brown opinions will throw into higher relief 
any lessons drawn from the critique. 
I. THE TERMS
We associate the color-blind Constitution with Brown I,9 the 
case in which the Supreme Court determined that the Constitution 
barred states from requiring black and white children to attend 
different schools. Because separate schools are “inherently unequal,”
segregation deprived the plaintiff children “of the equal protection of 
the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.”10 In the 
relatively short, unanimous opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Earl
Warren revealed the ethos-based equality rationale of the decision, 
pointing out that the first Supreme Court case construing the 
Fourteenth Amendment had “interpreted it as proscribing all state-
                                                     
7. One of the authors of the Government’s briefs described their 
preparation and consequences in detail. NORMAN I. SILBER, WITH ALL DELIBERATE 
SPEED: THE LIFE OF PHILIP ELMAN, AN ORAL HISTORY MEMOIR (2004) [hereinafter 
ELMAN ORAL HISTORY].  
8. This Article will cite to the briefs in the form in which they are 
available on Westlaw and Lexis whenever possible. Some briefs are not contained 
within those databases, so in those cases, I will cite to the nearly 2,500 pages of 
briefs and arguments compiled within 49 & 49A LANDMARK BRIEFS AND 
ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (1954 & 1955) (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard 
Casper eds., 1975).  
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
10. Id. at 495. 
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imposed discriminations” on the basis of race.11 “Our Constitution is 
color-blind,” the quote from Justice John Marshall Harlan’s dissent 
in Plessy v. Ferguson,12 appears nowhere in Brown I. Yet the phrase 
has become embedded in our collective memory as a stand-in for the 
meaning of that opinion.13
We associate all deliberate speed with Brown II, the case in 
which the Supreme Court—after severing its determination that the 
Constitution had been violated from the relief to be granted—
decided that the remedy for unconstitutional segregation was to 
remand the cases to the federal district courts for further action.14
This time, the memorable phrase appeared in the opinion itself: the 
Supreme Court ordered the district courts to assure that the public 
schools acted “with all deliberate speed” to admit students on a 
racially nondiscriminatory basis.15
At first glance, the two phrases have different kinds of 
unanticipated consequences. We can imagine ourselves as the brief 
writers who signed on to the argument that the government should 
act in a color-blind way, that it should not make distinctions on the 
basis of racial classifications. In our imagined roles, when we made 
that argument, we most likely assumed that racial classifications 
would be used only for the purpose of adverse discrimination (as 
Chief Justice Warren wrote in Loving v. Virginia, the statutory 
language alone demonstrated that there was no reason for the racial 
classification barring blacks and whites from marrying except for the 
maintenance of white supremacy16). Still imagining ourselves as the 
brief writers, we expected that any time legislative classifications 
and distinctions were made on racial grounds, they would result in 
disadvantage for some subordinated group; and we at least implicitly 
predicted that the purpose of such classifications would be to 
maintain a current advantage for some favored group. In other 
words, we failed to anticipate that federal, state, and local 
government entities and agencies might someday make racial 
                                                     
11. Id. at 490.  
12. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
13. The phrase was repeated in the Government’s first amicus brief. Brief 
for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 4, Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Nos. 8, 
101, 191, 413, 448), 1952 WL 82045. 
14. Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
15. Id. (emphasis added).  
16. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (“The fact that Virginia 
prohibits only interracial marriages involving white persons demonstrates that the 
racial classifications must stand on their own justification, as measures designed to 
maintain White Supremacy.”).
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distinctions to equalize opportunities for all rather than to 
discriminate against marginalized classes. We failed to be optimistic 
enough about the consequences of the equality-under-the-law 
arguments that prevailed in Brown I. 
As for all deliberate speed, what we (standing in again for the 
brief writers) failed to anticipate seems distinctive. Rather than 
failing to anticipate progress, we failed to anticipate the opposite. We 
failed to be pessimistic enough about the resistance of those who 
wished to hold on to structures and systems that perpetuated existing 
hierarchies. Gradualism prevailed in Brown II because it was “the 
formula that [the] Court needed” to decide “the constitutional issue 
in the strong, forthright, unanimous way that it did.” Unanimity was 
thought to be essential to assure that the decision would be accepted 
and followed throughout the country.17 What both the Government 
brief writers and the Court failed to anticipate was how far-reaching 
and profound the reaction would be as some communities tried to 
hold off the impending societal sea change. 
Illustrating the first kind of unanticipated consequence, when 
the Supreme Court in 2007 limited the use of race in assigning 
students to public schools in the Seattle School District case, the five 
opinions cited Brown v. Board of Education nearly 100 times.18 In 
his plurality opinion, Chief Justice John Roberts quoted not only 
from the briefs filed in Brown on behalf of the schoolchildren but 
also from the transcript of the oral argument.19 Robert Carter, one of 
the lawyers for the children, had said: “We have one fundamental 
contention . . . . [N]o state has any authority under the equal-
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to use race as a 
factor in affording educational opportunities among its citizens.”20
Justice Roberts cited this comment in support of his contention that 
Brown itself, not to mention the schoolchildren’s lawyers, supported 
the majority’s proscription against any use of race in school 
assignments.21 After the 2007 decision, Judge Carter, then a ninety-
year-old senior federal judge in Manhattan, responded to the opinion 
by saying that Justice Roberts was “stand[ing] that argument on its 
                                                     
17. ELMAN ORAL HISTORY, supra note 7, at 206. 
18. See generally Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 
1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).  
19. Id. at 747.  
20. Id. (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954), (No. 8)).
21. Id.  
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head.”22 He pointed out that at the time of Brown, “[a]ll that race was 
used for . . . was to deny equal opportunity to black people.”23
In contrast, the author of the Government brief who claimed 
credit for the concept of all deliberate speed seemed unfazed by its 
later reception. Philip Elman recognized that supporting a delay in 
implementation in order to gain a unanimous decision was 
unprincipled and indefensible. In his words, it was telling the 
children whose personal constitutional rights were being violated 
that “you’re right, . . . [b]ut we’re not going to do a damn thing for 
you. . . . We’ll take care of your children, perhaps. Or your 
grandchildren.”24  
Still, in a lengthy oral history, Elman called the argument he 
made on behalf of the United States “the one thing I’m proudest of in 
my whole career.”25 Elman clarified: 
[That’s not] because it’s a beautifully written brief; I don’t think it is. 
Rather, it’s because we were the first to suggest . . . that if the Court 
should hold that racial segregation in public schools is unconstitutional, it 
should give district courts a reasonable period of time to work out the 
details and timing of implementation of the decision. In other words, “with 
all deliberate speed.” The reason I’m so proud of that proposal is that it 
offered the Court a way out of its dilemma, a way to end racial segregation 
without inviting massive disobedience, a way to decide the constitutional 
issue unanimously without tearing the Court apart.26  
Articulating these consequences suggests that rather than being 
distinctive, the brief writers’ failures to anticipate amounted to the 
same shortcoming: They were simply unable to see how far later 
challenges might stretch their reasoning. Still, my thesis stands: 
There is a real, qualitative difference between these arguments that 
affects the nature of their unanticipated consequences. In the 
remainder of this Article, in an effort to provide principled support 
for my claim, I will suggest and follow an approach that combines 
narrative, metaphor, and constitutional interpretation. Together, these 
will provide guidelines for “judging” the arguments made. 
                                                     
22. Adam Liptak, The Same Words but Differing Views, N.Y. TIMES, June 
29, 2007, at A24. 
23. Id.
24. ELMAN ORAL HISTORY, supra note 7, at 202-03. 
25. Id. at 202. 
26. Id.  
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II. DO THE STORIES HANG TOGETHER? DO THEY RING TRUE? 
To serve as a counterpoint to scientific discourse and technical 
logic (what he called the rational paradigm),27 Walter Fisher 
developed the concept of narrative rationality.28 From this 
perspective, the briefs in Brown I and Brown II constitute 
sometimes-competing stories about how America should address 
foundational and inescapable questions of race, public education, and 
schoolchildren. What kind of stories do the briefs tell? Do their 
arguments fit within the grand progressive narrative of America? Are 
the stories instead compelled by other visions of the nation, the 
Constitution’s history, and the nature of judicial review? 
Assessments based on narrative rationality yield qualitatively 
different results than those founded on technical logic.29 Although 
Fisher delineated principles and criteria, the narrative paradigm is 
not a formal system or model for analysis. Its function “is to offer a 
way of interpreting and assessing human communication that leads 
to critique, a determination of whether or not a given instance of 
                                                     
27. As Fisher noted, the principles of narrative rationality align with 
Aristotle’s practical wisdom. In Aristotle’s description, while “wisdom” combined 
scientific knowledge and intuitive thought, “[p]ractical wisdom . . . is concerned 
with things human and things about which it is possible to deliberate.” ARISTOTLE,
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 144-51 (David Ross trans., Oxford Univ. Press ed. 1980) (c. 
350 B.C.E.). The person who is practically wise not only makes wise decisions, but 
recognizes the best ways in which to act to fulfill the desired outcome. Id.
28. Professor Fisher discussed the narrative paradigm in a number of 
articles, with some understandable shifts in emphasis and phrasing over time. See
Walter R. Fisher, Toward a Logic of Good Reasons, 64 QUARTERLY J. SPEECH 376, 
378 (1978) [hereinafter Good Reasons]; Walter R. Fisher, Narration as a Human 
Communication Paradigm: The Case of Public Moral Argument, 51 COMM.
MONOGRAPHS 1, 2 (1984) [hereinafter Narration as Paradigm]; Walter R. Fisher, 
The Narrative Paradigm: An Elaboration, 52 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 347, 348 (1985) 
[hereinafter An Elaboration]; Walter R. Fisher, Technical Logic, Rhetorical Logic, 
and Narrative Rationality, 1 ARGUMENTATION 3, 16-17 (1987) [hereinafter 
Technical Logic, Rhetorical Logic]; Walter R. Fisher, Clarifying the Narrative 
Paradigm, 56 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 55, 57 (1989) [hereinafter Clarifying]; Walter 
R. Fisher, Narrative Rationality and the Logic of Scientific Discourse, 8 
ARGUMENTATION 21, 23 (1994) [hereinafter Logic of Scientific Discourse]. See J. 
Christopher Rideout, Storytelling, Narrative Rationality, and Legal Persuasion, 14 
LEGAL WRITING 53, 57 (2008), for a synthesis of Fisher’s thought and application to 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701 (2007). 
29. Logic of Scientific Discourse, supra note 28, at 29. 
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discourse provides a reliable, trustworthy, and desirable guide to 
thought and action in the world.”30
Unlike the judgments of technical logic, narrative rationality 
uncovers and weighs the role of values in human reasoning and 
actions. According to Fisher, the uncovering and weighing of values 
is essential to “restore a consciousness of whether [something should 
be done] in our conceptions of knowledge.”31 In Fisher’s terms, we 
know that nuclear power exists, and we know how to use it, but the 
question of whether it should be used cannot be answered through 
logical rationality.32 Unless we are able to restore this sense of 
whether to our reasoning, Fisher concludes that technical knowledge 
will stifle “concerns of happiness, justice, and humanity.”33
Narrative rationality applies to arguments in any form and any 
genre. According to Fisher, “[n]o matter how rigorously a case is 
argued—scientifically, philosophically, or legally—it will always be 
a story, an interpretation of some aspect of the world which is 
historically and culturally grounded and shaped by human 
personality.”34 The best stories hang together and appear to us to ring 
true to the way people act and events occur in the world we live in. 
Because humans in Fisher’s view are predominantly storytellers 
(homo narrans) rather than mostly rational (homo sapiens), and 
because our experience is full of story telling and story 
understanding, everyone has the ability to judge the worth of a legal 
brief in terms of a story. 
Accepting humans as storytellers, Fisher’s narrative paradigm 
presents the world as “a set of stories which must be chosen among 
to live the good life in a process of continual recreation.”35 Though 
not the deliberative process of the rational paradigm, the choice 
among stories is not irrational. Instead, its rationality is determined 
by two qualities:  
narrative probability (how well the story hangs together: is it internally 
coherent, complete, and consistent?) and  
                                                     
30. An Elaboration, supra note 28, at 351. 
31. Logic of Scientific Discourse, supra note 28, at 30. 
32. Id. at 25. 
33. Id. at 30.  
34. Technical Logic, Rhetorical Logic, supra note 28, at 17. 
35. Narration as Paradigm, supra note 28, at 8. 
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narrative fidelity (whether the story rings true with other stories we know 
to be true: do its “good reasons” and values accord with our 
experiences?).36  
In the rational paradigm, the listener chooses after deliberation.37 In 
the narrative paradigm, the listener chooses among stories because of 
“identification” in the Burkean sense.38 Thus, the listener selects a 
story when she can identify with the speaker because they share 
something of substance (a sense of what constitutes a good reason 
and what values are relevant and substantial).  
The first quality, narrative probability, is assessed by looking to 
the structural or formal features of the narrative—the coherence of 
the actions and characters within the story itself.39 The story elements 
must hang together (structural coherence); the story must address or 
contain the important elements and relationships of similar stories 
that we have encountered before (material coherence); and the 
characters, both actors and author, must act in ways that warrant our 
belief in them (characterological coherence).40
The second quality, narrative fidelity, is evaluated by looking 
to whether the substantive features of the story match up with what 
we think about how the world works.41 The measure of narrative 
fidelity is “the degree to which it accords with the logic of good 
reasons.”42 That logic, Fisher says, is measured (somewhat 
redundantly) by “the soundness of its reasoning and the value of its 
values.”43
As for the soundness of its reasoning, Fisher describes good 
reasons as “elements that provide warrants for accepting or 
adhering” to the arguments made in any rhetorical communication.44
The weighing of these reasons involves a familiar process. We check 
the facts, we look for missing facts and arguments, we evaluate the 
strength of the reasoning, and we make sure that all the important 
issues have been addressed.45
As for the value of its values, we first identify the implicit and 
explicit values underlying the message and then determine whether 
                                                     
36. An Elaboration, supra note 28, at 349. 
37. Id. at 350. 
38. KENNETH BURKE, A RHETORIC OF MOTIVES 19-23 (1969). 
39. Logic of Scientific Discourse, supra note 28, at 23-24. 
40. Id. at 24. 
41. An Elaboration, supra note 28, at 349-50. 
42. Id.  
43. Id.  
44. Good Reasons, supra note 28, at 378.  
45. Id. at 379.  
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they match up with the nature of the decision and the beliefs of the 
audience: “What would be the effects of adhering to the values . . . ? 
Are the values confirmed or validated in one’s experience . . . ? [A]re 
the values fostered by the story those that would constitute a humane 
basis for human conduct?”46
To evaluate the narrative fidelity of the Government’s briefs, 
whether they ring true in light of their use of “good reasons” within 
the genre of arguments about constitutional interpretation,47 I propose 
to adapt a framework suggested by Ian Bartrum.48 Bartrum in turn 
relies on Philip Bobbitt’s modalities for constitutional arguments49
and Max Black’s theory of metaphor.50 Bartrum’s thesis is that the 
interaction of modalities, viewed metaphorically and thus 
generatively, may create new constitutional meaning and overcome 
long-standing interpretive deadlocks created by conflicting 
arguments.51
Fisher points out that narrative rationality looks to the available 
standards for assessing arguments. Because Bobbitt’s modalities for 
legitimating constitutional arguments are both well-accepted and 
readily available standards, they can be seen to constitute 
quintessentially “good reasons”52 in Fisher’s terms. Thus, Bobbitt’s
                                                     
46. Logic of Scientific Discourse, supra note 28, at 24.  
47. Technical Logic, Rhetorical Logic, supra note 28, at 17 (quoting Good 
Reasons, supra note 28, at 378).  
48. Ian C. Bartrum, Metaphors and Modalities: Meditations on Bobbitt’s 
Theory of the Constitution, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 157, 160 (2008).  
49. See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (1982); PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991).  
50. See generally MAX BLACK, MODELS AND METAPHORS: STUDIES IN 
LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHY (1962); Max Black, More About Metaphor, in 
METAPHOR AND THOUGHT (Andrew Ortony ed., 2d ed. 1993) [hereinafter More 
About Metaphor]. In addition to Max Black, this Article relies for its understanding 
of cognitive theory and research about metaphor primarily on the following books: 
GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980); GEORGE 
LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND AND ITS 
CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT (1999); STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE 
FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND (2001). I have explored similar concepts in prior
articles. See generally, e.g., Linda L. Berger, Of Metaphor, Metonymy, and 
Corporate Money: Rhetorical Choices in Supreme Court Decisions on Campaign 
Finance Regulation, 58 MERCER L. REV. 949 (2007); Linda L. Berger, What is the 
Sound of a Corporation Speaking? How the Cognitive Theory of Metaphor Can 
Help Lawyers Shape the Law, 2 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: J. ASS’N LEGAL 
WRITING DIRECTORS 169 (2004). 
51. Bartrum, supra note 48, at 160-61.  
52. Professor Bartrum writes that:  
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modalities (or archetypes) of argument will become one way to test 
the soundness of the good reasons provided in the briefs. These 
modalities include: 
1. historical arguments drawing on the circumstances of the period in 
which the relevant constitutional provision was drafted and adopted in 
order to “marshal[] the intent” of the framers;
2. text-based arguments asserting the “present sense” of the language 
used; 
3. structural arguments relying on inferences derived from the structures 
and relationships established by the Constitution; 
4. prudential arguments “advancing particular doctrines according to the 
practical wisdom of using the courts in a particular way”;
5. doctrinal arguments setting forth principles from precedent or from 
prior commentary on the precedent; and 
6. ethical arguments drawing on “the character, or ethos, of the American 
polity,” arguments “whose force relies on a characterization of American 
institutions and the role within them of the American people.”53  
Ethical arguments will become especially important in the 
assessment of the Government’s briefs,54 and so it may be helpful to 
provide several examples. Bobbitt used as an example Justice Lewis 
Powell’s opinion in Moore v. City of East Cleveland.55 There, the 
Court found unconstitutional an Ohio zoning ordinance that limited 
occupancy of a dwelling to the members of one family.56 Justice 
Powell justified the decision in favor of the challengers—a
grandmother, her son, and her two grandsons (who were cousins, not 
brothers)—on the basis that “the Constitution protects the sanctity of 
the family” and “[o]urs is by no means a tradition limited to respect 
for the bonds uniting the members of the nuclear family.”57 This 
                                                                                                               
[T]he great lesson of Bobbitt’s work is that there are rules to follow. It is 
not useful to build theories on argumentative modalities that are entirely 
outside of the existing practice—to do so is akin to speaking the wrong 
language, or uttering nonsense words, when trying to express an important 
point in conversation. 
Id. at 188 (emphasis omitted). 
53. BOBBITT, supra note 49, at 7, 94 (emphasis omitted), reprinted in Philip 
Bobbitt, From Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution, in INTERPRETING 
LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER 363, 363-82 (Sanford Levinson &
Steven Mailloux eds., 1988).  
54. See infra Part IV. 
55. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); BOBBITT, supra
note 49, at 96.  
56. Moore, 431 U.S. at 495, 506.  
57. Id. at 496, 503-04.  
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argument, Bobbitt suggests, not only allows the court to deal with the 
prior precedent in a different way but also establishes the opinion 
itself as a different kind of precedent for the future. 
Similarly, in Obergefell v. Hodges,58 the recent Supreme Court 
decision holding that the Constitution protects the right to marry of 
same-sex couples, Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote: 
The right of same-sex couples to marry that is part of the liberty promised 
by the Fourteenth Amendment is derived, too, from that Amendment’s 
guarantee of the equal protection of the laws. The Due Process Clause and 
the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound way, though they 
set forth independent principles. Rights implicit in liberty and rights 
secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts and are not 
always co-extensive, yet in some instances each may be instructive as to 
the meaning and reach of the other. In any particular case one Clause may 
be thought to capture the essence of the right in a more accurate and 
comprehensive way, even as the two Clauses may converge in the 
identification and definition of the right. This interrelation of the two 
principles furthers our understanding of what freedom is and must 
become.59
Like Justice Powell’s argument in Moore, Justice Kennedy’s 
reasoning appears to be based on a broader underlying 
characterization of freedom that is implicit in the American ethos. 
Bartrum’s metaphorical modalities approach treats two of 
Bobbitt’s argument archetypes as if they were the two parts of a 
metaphor, but not in the way we usually understand metaphors to 
work. For example, in the familiar metaphors the corporation is a 
person and the First Amendment is a marketplace of ideas, each 
metaphor is thought to work because the listener maps some of the 
attributes and characteristics of the more concrete or familiar source 
(the person, the marketplace) onto the more abstract or unfamiliar 
target (the corporation, the First Amendment). As a result of this 
ability to see one thing “as” another, some relationships and 
inferences transfer, but others do not; some features are highlighted, 
and others are obscured. The process of viewing the target “as” the 
source shifts the listener’s perspective and understanding, and in this 
way, the metaphorical process is thought to create new meaning. 
In Max Black’s conception of how metaphor works (influenced 
by the early interaction theory of I.A. Richards), new meaning is 
generated in much the same way that rubbing two sticks together 
ignites both of them.60 Black’s theory is best explained through the 
                                                     
58. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
59. Id. at 2602-03.
60. More About Metaphor, supra note 50, at 27-28. 
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example of a metaphorical statement containing a word that becomes 
the focus (this word is used in a non-literal sense and does most of 
the metaphorical heavy lifting) while the rest of the sentence (used in 
a more concrete sense) serves as the frame.61 For example, in the 
sentence, “[t]he United States is an indivisible ‘Union of sovereign 
States,’”62 the word Union becomes the focus, and the rest of the 
sentence becomes the frame. The sentence is metaphorical because 
the United States is not literally a “Union” (the States are not literally 
“sovereigns” either, but that does not appear to be the metaphorical 
focus here). Within the frame encompassing the United States and 
the sovereign States, the word Union focuses our understanding on 
the attributes and characteristics that bind the States together rather 
than on the things that divide them. In this sentence, the word Union
may overpower the impression of sovereignty for each of the States. 
So the interaction of the frame and the focus highlights a particular 
perspective of the United States, and it changes our understanding of 
“union” and “sovereign” as well.  
Also important in Black’s view is the difference between weak 
and strong metaphors. Strong metaphors are more likely to generate 
insight into “how things are.”63 As Black describes it, a strong 
metaphor has the qualities of being both emphatic and resonant. A 
metaphorical statement is emphatic if the author would not allow a 
substitution for the “salient word or expression,” the word whose 
appearance in the frame “invests the utterance with metaphorical 
force.”64 A metaphorical statement is resonant if the interpretive 
response can go on to a greater extent; metaphorical statements that 
are relatively rich in elaboration potential are resonant.65
Turning to the two phrases that are the objects of this analysis, 
each appears to be a metaphorical stand-in for a different modality or 
archetype of argument. The color-blind Constitution embodies the 
ethos or ethical argument while all deliberate speed embodies the 
prudential or practical argument. Based on his analysis of the 
Supreme Court opinions in Brown I and Brown II, Bartrum 
                                                     
61. Id. at 26-27.
62. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2511 (2012) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added) (quoting Hinderlider v. 
La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 104 (1938)).  
63. More About Metaphor, supra note 50, at 39 (pointing to charts and 
graphs as other familiar devices that show “how things are” without being “mere 
substitutes for bundles of statement of fact”). 
64. Id. at 26. 
65. Id. at 25-27.
1410 Michigan State Law Review  2015:1397 
concluded that the ethos-based or ethical arguments constituted the 
frame (built by tracing the evolution of equality principles from the 
Declaration of Independence on) and that the prudential or practical 
arguments constituted the focus (these were the arguments from the 
NAACP briefs based on social science and psychological research 
indicating that segregation negatively affected black children and the 
arguments from the Government’s briefs on the desirability of 
delay).66 Bartrum suggested that the metaphorical modality of the 
resulting ethical–prudential argument was the “creative push” needed 
to resolve the difficult conflict between the modalities.67 The text of 
the Fourteenth Amendment “plainly promised ‘equal protection,’ but 
the doctrine permitted ‘separate but equal’ treatment; history 
suggested that the Fourteenth Amendment did not reach segregated 
schooling, but the constitutional structure hardly seemed to favor 
barriers to conversation and association among citizens.”68
While Bartrum depicted the interaction of arguments as 
creative and generative,69 the author most associated with the 
government’s briefs, Philip Elman, constructed a more skeptical 
combination of forces that overcame the deadlock on the Court. In 
Elman’s view, the successful outcome was based on a combination 
of God (the death of Chief Justice Fred Vinson in 1953 and his 
replacement by Earl Warren) and all deliberate speed (the argument 
counseling delay).70
                                                     
66. Bartrum, supra note 48, at 183-85.  
67. Id. at 184.  
68. Id. at 179 (emphasis omitted).  
69. Recognizing possible objections to the combination, Bartrum responded 
that: 
[E]thical-prudentialism takes the basic, elemental principles of the 
American ethos as its principal and defining context; it looks first to those 
democratic, egalitarian, and libertarian values that define who we are—or 
who we want to be—as a nation. But the metaphor then tempers ethical 
idealism by focusing prudentially on the social and political realities of 
governing a large and diverse population.  
. . . [I]t was the Court’s grammatical creativity—its willingness to re-
envision and realign the accepted modalities at a critical moment in the 
nation’s history—that enabled it to overcome a two-year judicial standoff 
and render the most important constitutional decision of the last century. 
Id. at 185-86. 
70. ELMAN ORAL HISTORY, supra note 7, at 219.  
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III. THE EQUAL CITIZENSHIP BRIEFS 
Much of the dispute about Brown’s legacy centers on what the 
Fourteenth Amendment means when it guarantees “equal protection 
of the laws.”71 As a result of the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, does the Constitution affirmatively guarantee 
opportunities to achieve equal citizenship? Is it opposed to the 
maintenance of castes or group subordination? Does the Constitution 
prohibit all racial classifications no matter the purpose?72
After the Civil War, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments promised an end to slavery and a guarantee of “equal 
protection of the laws.” The NAACP briefs filed on behalf of the 
schoolchildren in Brown were constructed upon a mutually 
reinforcing framework of textual and doctrinal arguments as well as 
ethically based equality principles going back to the Declaration of 
Independence and re-stated in the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
early Supreme Court opinions interpreting it.73
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads as follows: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
                                                     
71. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
72. Jack M. Balkin, Brown as Icon, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE 
AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION 3, 3 (2001). Justice Harlan’s dissent 
in Plessy provides support for all views: in the light of the “[C]onstitution, in the eye 
of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. 
There is no caste here. Our [C]onstitution is color-blind and neither knows nor 
tolerates classes among citizens.” Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting).  
  As for any claim of equal treatment of blacks and whites, Justice Harlan 
wrote:  
Every one knows that the statute in question had its origin in [the] 
purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied 
by blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or 
assigned to white persons. . . . The thing to accomplish was, under the 
guise of giving equal accommodations for whites and blacks, to compel 
the latter to keep to themselves while traveling in railroad passenger 
coaches. 
Id. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
73. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); Strauder v. 
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). 
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process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.74  
In the Slaughter-House Cases, its first opportunity to interpret this 
language, the Court narrowed the promise of a broad interpretation.
Instead, the Court interpreted the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
as covering only those privileges and rights accruing because of 
national citizenship and the Equal Protection Clause as protecting 
only against state discrimination or denial of rights on the basis of 
race.75  
Nonetheless, the door to potentially more expansive 
interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment stayed open. In 
Strauder v. West Virginia, the Court found unconstitutional a state’s
exclusion of blacks from juries on the ground that the exclusion 
constituted “practically a brand upon them” and erected a barrier to 
“equal justice.”76 Even though the words of the Fourteenth 
Amendment were prohibitory, prohibiting state action abridging or 
denying privileges, immunities, and equal protection, the Strauder
Court said that “they [also] contain a necessary implication of a 
positive immunity, or right.”77 This is the “right to exemption from 
unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored,—
exemption from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil 
society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which 
others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards reducing 
them to the condition of a subject race.”78 Similarly, in Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, the Court found that a San Francisco ordinance that had a 
discriminatory impact on Chinese businesses was unconstitutional.79
And in Buchanan v. Warley, the NAACP won a case challenging the 
constitutionality of a Louisiana law that kept blacks from living in 
some parts of town.80
Despite the scope of equal protection recognized in these early 
cases, the Supreme Court constructed a long-lasting doctrinal barrier 
in its Plessy v. Ferguson holding that “separate but equal” facilities 
                                                     
74. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
75. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 80-81.  
76. 100 U.S. at 308.
77. Id. at 307. 
78. Id. at 308. 
79. 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886). The ordinance banned laundries in wooden 
buildings, which was where most Chinese located their businesses. Id. at 357-59.  
80. 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917).  
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were consistent with the U.S. Constitution.81 Affecting not only the 
specific facilities at issue, “Plessy metastasized, infecting more than 
half a century of constitutional law,” including a decision allowing 
Mississippi to require a Chinese girl to attend black schools.82
Moreover, by requiring challengers to address the question of 
whether separate public schools were in fact equal, Plessy’s holding 
diverted attention from the question of what kind of educational 
opportunities should be provided to all. 
Led by Charles Hamilton Houston and, after 1936, by 
Thurgood Marshall, the NAACP developed the litigation strategy of 
attacking the states’ discriminatory actions across the board, 
including a “step-by-step assault on segregation in education.” That 
campaign began in the 1930s.83 By 1948, the NAACP had prevailed 
in Shelley v. Kraemer, persuading the Supreme Court to find racially 
restrictive property covenants to be unconstitutional.84
Important graduate and professional school challenges 
followed. In Sweatt v. Painter, the NAACP lawyers successfully 
argued that the separate black law school set up when the University 
of Texas Law School denied admission to black students was not in 
fact equal.85 Although the Supreme Court issued an injunction 
against the admissions policy in Sweatt, it did not address the 
continuing precedential value of Plessy because Plessy’s holding was 
not directly implicated.86 In McLaurin v. Board of Regents, the Court 
required the University of Oklahoma to remove the restrictions under 
which it had allowed a black student to attend graduate school, 
holding that they too were unconstitutional.87
By the time the cases that would be consolidated in Brown 
were filed in the Supreme Court, the NAACP had a record of 
successful equal protection challenges to cite,88 and the 
organization’s litigation strategy for elementary schools had shifted.
The new lawsuits would demand desegregation rather than 
                                                     
81. 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1954) (upholding a Louisiana law that 
segregated railroad cars).  
82. See GREENBERG, supra note 6, at 4, 14 (citing Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 
U.S. 78 (1927)). Along with Plessy, Gong Lum would pose the major doctrinal 
obstacle to the arguments on behalf of the schoolchildren in Brown. 
83. GREENBERG, supra note 6, at 4-6.  
84. 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948). 
85. 339 U.S. 629, 636 (1950). 
86. Id. at 635-36. 
87. 339 U.S. 637, 641-42 (1950). 
88. Statement as to Jurisdiction at *5-12, Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 
1951 WL 82600 [hereinafter Statement as to Jurisdiction].  
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equalization.89 The first of the eventually consolidated cases was 
Briggs v. Elliott, which was filed in November 1950 in Clarendon 
County, South Carolina.90 In Briggs, the NAACP put on as a witness 
Kenneth B. Clark, an assistant professor of psychology at City 
College of New York who testified about the infamous “dolls” test 
that demonstrated the effects of societal discrimination.91 In March of 
1951, Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka was filed.92 Davis v. 
County School Board was filed in Prince Edward County, Virginia, 
in May 1951.93 And in Delaware in July 1951, Gebhart v. Belton was 
filed.94 The fifth of the consolidated cases, Bolling v. Sharpe, was 
brought in the District of Columbia and was not filed by the 
NAACP.95
By July of 1951, the NAACP began seeking Supreme Court 
review of the adverse rulings that had come down, first in Briggs,
and then in Brown.96 The Court scheduled arguments in Briggs and 
Brown for October 1952, but the arguments were postponed until 
December, and the Court joined Bolling v. Sharpe,97 from the District 
of Columbia, with the other cases. In Delaware, the NAACP won.98
In Kansas, a new school board decided it would no longer defend the 
                                                     
89. In earlier litigation, the plaintiffs had sometimes argued in favor of 
requiring the school systems to actually provide equal separate schools on the theory 
that the cost of actual equality would encourage the states to voluntarily desegregate.  
90. See Briggs v. Elliott, 103 F. Supp. 920, 921 (E.D.S.C. 1952), rev’d sub 
nom. Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Briggs v. Elliott, 342 U.S. 350, 351 (1952) 
(sending the case back to the trial court). The cases and the trials in each are 
described in GREENBERG, supra note 6, at 62-88.  
91. See Bruce L. Hay, The Damned Dolls, 26 LAW & LITERATURE 321, 323, 
333 (2014), for an unusual analysis of the use of this research.  
92. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951), rev’d sub 
nom. Brown II, 349 U.S. 294. 
93. Davis v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952), rev’d sub 
nom. Brown II, 349 U.S. 294. 
94. Gebhart v. Belton, 91 A.2d 137 (Del. 1952), aff’d sub nom. Brown II,
349 U.S. 294. 
95. Bolling v. Sharpe, 344 U.S. 873 (1952), opinion after grant of cert.,
347 U.S. 497 (1954), supplemented sub nom. Brown II, 349 U.S. 294.  
  Because the District of Columbia was not a state, the Fourteenth 
Amendment arguments did not apply. See GREENBERG, supra note 6, at 63. In 
Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500, the Court determined that “[i]n view of our decision that 
the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public 
schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser 
duty on the Federal Government.”
96. GREENBERG, supra note 6, at 89-92.  
97. Id.
98. Id.  
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case, but the Supreme Court requested the Kansas attorney general to 
appear.99 After finally hearing oral arguments in the consolidated 
cases in December 1952, the Court postponed its decision and asked 
for reargument, which eventually occurred in 1954.100
In the first NAACP brief filed in Brown, the Statement of 
Jurisdiction, the authors linked the “preservation of strong 
democratic institutions” to the “intelligence and enlighte[n]ment of 
our citizenry” and argued that when the educational development of 
some students is hurt by state practices, “it becomes impossible to 
fully muster the capabilities and energies of the country to meet 
whatever crises lie ahead.”101 According to the brief writers, the 
decisions in McLaurin and Sweatt had established that it was 
unconstitutional for the states to segregate students at the 
professional and graduate school level.102 The issues in Brown I were 
of even greater importance. As soon as children start going to school, 
they immediately begin to “integrate and formulate basic ideas and 
attitudes about the society in which they live.”103 If their early ideas 
and attitudes  
are born and fashioned within a segregated educational framework, 
students of both the majority and minority groups are not only limited in a 
full and complete interchange of ideas and responses, but are confronted 
and influenced by value judgments, sanctioned by their society which 
establishes qualitative distinctions on the basis of race.104
Schools simply “cannot be separated” from the culture “in which [a] 
child lives.”105 As the emotional core of the argument, then, “[a child] 
cannot attend separate schools and learn the meaning of equality.”106
Starting from the foundation established in Sweatt and 
McLaurin, the brief built its argument that state-imposed racial 
segregation violates the “Fourteenth Amendment because such 
restrictions handicap the applicant in his pursuit of knowledge and 
necessarily deprive him of equal educational opportunities.”107
Conceding that Sweatt and McLaurin held that the particular acts of 
state segregation involved did not satisfy even the Plessy doctrine 
                                                     
99. Id.
100. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 488 (1954).  
101. Statement as to Jurisdiction, supra note 88, at *5.  
102. See id.
103. Id. at *6. 
104. Id.
105. Id.  
106. Id.  
107. Id. at *9-10.  
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(because the separate educational facilities that had been established 
by the states were not actually equal), the NAACP’s brief on the 
merits in Brown I went on to claim that a new doctrine was now
clearly established. As a result, the plaintiffs asked the Court to 
finally hold that segregation in itself is always unconstitutional.108
The NAACP briefs in Brown I were thus constructed upon a 
doctrinal frame of the advocates’ own construction;109 the brief 
writers had in rhetorical terms created their own kairos, or most 
                                                     
108. Brief for Appellants at *5-6, Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 1952 WL 
47265: 
 The Fourteenth Amendment precludes a state from imposing 
distinctions or classifications based upon race and color alone. The State 
of Kansas has no power thereunder to use race as a factor in affording 
educational opportunities to its citizens. 
 Racial segregation in public schools reduces the benefits of public 
education to one group solely on the basis of race and color and is a 
constitutionally proscribed distinction. Even assuming that the segregated 
schools attended by appellants are not inferior to other elementary schools 
in Topeka with respect to physical facilities, instruction and courses of 
study, unconstitutional inequality inheres in the retardation of intellectual 
development and distortion of personality which Negro children suffer as 
a result of enforced isolation in school from the general public school 
population. Such injury and inequality are established as facts on this 
appeal by the uncontested findings of the District Court. 
 The District Court reasoned that it could not rectify the inequality 
that it had found because of this Court’s decisions in Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 and Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78. This Court has already 
decided that the Plessy case is not in point. Reliance upon Gong Lum v. 
Rice is mistaken since the basic assumption of that case is the existence of 
equality while no such assumption can be made here in the face of the 
established facts. Moreover, more recent decisions of this Court, most 
notably Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 and McLaurin v. Board of 
Regents, 339 U.S. 637, clearly show that such hurtful consequences of 
segregated schools as appear here constitute a denial of equal educational 
opportunities in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, the 
court below erred in denying the relief prayed by appellants. 
109. See id. at *7-8 (citations omitted): 
 Since 1940, in an unbroken line of decisions, this Court has clearly 
enunciated the doctrine that the state may not validly impose distinctions 
and restrictions among its citizens based upon race or color alone in each 
field of governmental activity where question has been raised. On the 
other hand, when the state has sought to protect its citizenry against racial 
discrimination and prejudice, its action has been consistently upheld . . . . 
 It follows, therefore, that under this doctrine, the State of Kansas 
which by statutory sanctions seeks to subject appellants, in their pursuit of 
elementary education, to distinctions based upon race or color alone, is 
here attempting to exceed the constitutional limits to its authority. 
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opportune moment.110 Drawing on the terminology of metaphorical 
modalities, the doctrinal frame was reinforced and filled out by 
textual, ethical, and prudential arguments. Rather than the expected 
collision of the ethos-based argument with the Plessy holding, the 
argument modalities put to work in the NAACP brief were mutually 
supporting. And they were mutually supporting because the 
NAACP’s past victories had weakened the conflicting doctrine. 
When it came to Brown II, the NAACP brief maintained a 
consistent theme and balance. As for the argument for a gradual 
remedy, the brief asserted that “[m]uch of the opposition to forthwith 
desegregation does not truly rest on any theory that it is better to 
accomplish it gradually. In considerable part, if indeed not in the 
main, such opposition stems from a desire that desegregation not be 
undertaken at all.”111 Returning again to the story of Brown I, the 
brief emphasized the overarching importance of the right at issue: 
“Appellants here seek effective protection for adjudicated 
constitutional rights which are personal and present.”112 Given a 
personal and present right deserving to be protected, the Court might 
impose a delay only if it had before it “a showing of clear legal 
precedent therefor and some public necessity of a gravity never as 
yet demonstrated.”113
IV. THE GOVERNMENT’S BRIEFS 
During the course of Brown I and Brown II, the United States 
filed three briefs and a memo as a friend of the court.114 Years later, 
                                                     
110. See Linda L. Berger, Creating Kairos at the Supreme Court: The 
Judicial Construction of Right Moments, 16 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS (forthcoming 
2015), for an explanation of kairos as rhetorical concept. 
111. Brief for Appellants in Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and for Respondents in No. 5 on 
Further Reargument at *31, Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 1954 WL 72725. 
112. Id.  
113. Id.  
114. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 
(Nos. 8, 101, 191, 413, 448), 1952 WL 82045 [hereinafter Brief for the United 
States]; Supplemental Brief for the United States on Reargument, Brown I, 347 U.S. 
483 (Nos. 1, 2, 4, 8, 10), 1953 WL 78291 [hereinafter Supplemental Brief for the 
United States]; Brief for the United States on the Further Argument of the Questions 
of Relief, Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, & 5), reprinted 
in 49A LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 739 (1975) [hereinafter Brief for the United States 
on Questions of Relief]; Supplemental Memorandum for the United States on the 
Further Argument of the Questions of Relief, Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (Nos. 1-
5), reprinted in 49A LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
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Philip Elman, the former Frankfurter clerk and one of the authors of 
the Government briefs, recounted at length how the briefs were 
constructed, including his role in their construction and reception.115
This Part relies not only on the briefs but also on the accounts of 
Elman and others.116
A. Brown I
In an amicus brief written by Elman and filed on behalf of the 
United States in Shelley v. Kraemer, the Government set forth the 
foundations of the ethos-based equality argument that the Solicitor 
General’s Office would continue to advance in Brown I: 
This Nation was founded upon the declaration that all men are endowed 
by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, and that among these rights 
are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. To that declaration was 
added the Fifth Amendment of the Bill of Rights, providing that no person 
shall be deprived of life; liberty or property without due process of law; 
and the Fourteenth Amendment, providing that no State shall deprive any 
person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law, nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. And 
Congress, exercising its power to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, has provided that all citizens of the United States shall have 
the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens 
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal 
property.117
Like the brief it filed in Shelley,118 the Government’s brief in 
Brown I emphasized the principle of equal rights under law. This 
ethical foundation was bolstered by significant prudential arguments 
(the United States is concerned about our ability to conduct foreign 
affairs when we are being justly criticized for segregationist 
policies,119 and we are equally worried about the “vexing problems”
                                                                                                               
THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 773 (1975) [hereinafter Supplemental 
Memorandum for the United States on Questions of Relief]. 
115. ELMAN ORAL HISTORY, supra note 7, at 199-205. 
116. In addition to ELMAN ORAL HISTORY, supra note 7, this includes 
GREENBERG, supra note 6, and RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF 
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY
(1976).  
117. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at *3-4, Shelley v. 
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (No. 72), 1947 WL 44159.  
118. Id.
119. Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN.
L. REV. 61, 62-63 (1988). 
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that will arise if the Court finds segregation to be in violation of the 
Constitution).120
The straightforward Table of Contents in the Government brief 
filed in 1952 in Brown I made these points: 
First, the United States has a substantial interest in the case 
because of its stake in equality principles generally and especially in 
how America looks to foreign countries. The brief argued that the 
Federal Government had recognized a “special responsibility for 
assuring vindication of the fundamental civil rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution,” and that there was in fact “general acceptance of an 
affirmative government obligation to insure respect for fundamental 
human rights.”121 The constitutional right involved in Brown I was 
the basic right to equal treatment before the law. Moreover, “[t]he 
proposition that all men are created equal is not mere rhetoric. It 
implies a rule of law . . . .”122
Next, and practically speaking, the Court might not find it 
necessary to reach the question of whether the Plessy principle of 
separate but equal schools violated the Constitution because all the 
cases before it involved unequal school facilities.123 If, however, the 
Court did reach that question, it should overrule Plessy. As the 
United States had stated in prior briefs, the brief contended again that 
“racial segregation imposed or supported by law is per se
unconstitutional.”124 The broad principle at issue, according to this 
brief, “is that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the classification of 
students on the basis of race or color so as to deny one group 
educational advantages and opportunities afforded to another.”125 The 
brief went on to cite a number of cases holding that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was “primarily designed to assure to [blacks] the right 
                                                     
120. Brief for the United States, supra note 114, at *28.  
121. Id. at *2.  
122. Id. at *3, *4 n.2 (relying on Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy).  
123. Id. at *10. The brief characterized all the lower court holdings as having 
found inequalities because the Kansas court—while concluding that the other factors 
were equal—had also found that the segregation had a detrimental effect upon black 
children. Id. at 12. This, the brief said, is a finding of “separate and hence unequal.” 
Id. at 13.  
124. Id. at *17 (emphasis omitted) (citing government briefs in Henderson v. 
United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); and 
McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950)).  
125. Id. at *18.  
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to be treated under the law exactly like white persons.”126 As a 
contraction of that right, the decision in Plessy was “irreconcilable 
with the body of decisions which preceded and followed” it.127
Whatever the merits of the Plessy decision at the time it was made, 
the brief said that “it should now be discarded as a negation of rights 
secured by the Constitution.”128 Constitutional provisions “are not 
mathematical formulas . . . they are organic living institutions.”129 In 
sum, Plessy was “an unwarranted departure . . . from the 
fundamental principle that all Americans, whatever their race or 
color, stand equal and alike before the law.”130
And finally, the brief suggested that if the Court overruled 
Plessy, it should remand the cases to the district courts so that relief 
could be structured in a way that would be “most likely to achieve 
orderly and expeditious transition.”131 Here, citing antitrust and 
nuisance cases, the Government argued that a court of equity can 
“fashion a remedy to meet the needs of the particular situation before 
it.”132 The brief suggested the Court take into account the need for 
“orderly and reasonable solution of the vexing problems which may 
arise.”133 And, in a footnote not repeated later, the Government 
lawyers wrote that the brief’s discussion of a reasonable and orderly 
transition “assumes that the separate schools for [black] children are 
in other respects ‘equal’” and noted that it “would be manifestly 
unfair and unjust, and contrary to the Court’s decisions, to withhold 
immediate relief where the separate schools are also physically 
unequal and inferior.”134
Although mentioning that the Court might not need to overrule 
Plessy, the brief pointed out that the Government had argued in prior 
cases that “racial segregation imposed or supported by law is per se 
unconstitutional.”135 The brief renewed, but did not “repeat[] in detail 
the grounds” for arguing that Plessy’s separate but equal rule was 
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“wrong as a matter of constitutional law, history, and policy.”136 Still, 
that Plessy should be overruled was at the heart of the argument.  
B. Brown I on Reargument 
On reargument, the Government’s 200-page brief addressed (as 
the Court had asked) the history of the Fourteenth Amendment.137 In 
the first 130 pages, the brief covered contemporary understandings 
of the Fourteenth Amendment starting with the Reconstruction 
Amendments and the status of blacks at the end of the Civil War, and 
then it proceeded through the legislative history of the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment by the states, and federal and state legislation on school 
segregation.138
Based on its version of this history, the Government brief 
concluded that the Court had the power to construe the Fourteenth 
Amendment as prohibiting racial segregation in public schools.
Moreover, if the Court held that such segregation was 
unconstitutional, the Court had the power to direct the resulting relief 
to “best serve the interests of justice in the circumstances.”139 Thus, if 
the Court held that school segregation was unconstitutional, the 
Court should remand to the lower courts with directions to carry out 
the decision “as speedily as the particular circumstances permit.”140
C. Brown II  
The Government’s brief in Brown II was filed in response to 
the Court’s invitation to participate in the further arguments of the 
parties on questions of relief.141 Again, the Table of Contents 
sketches the broad contours of the argument in a way that allows a 
judgment of the brief’s structural coherence.142
First, the Court has the equitable power to “direct such relief as 
will be most effective and just.”143 It is true that “[t]he vindication of 
                                                     
136. Id.  
137. Supplemental Brief for the United States, supra note 114, at *1 n.2.  
138. Id. at *3-131.  
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140. Id. at *168.  
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the constitutional rights involved should be as prompt as feasible.”144
Yet, “[t]he public interest requires an intelligent, orderly, and 
effective solution of the problems” of compliance “in particular 
areas.”145 And it is important to remember that “[t]he nature and 
extent of the problems that . . . desegregation. . . may entail will vary 
from area to area.”146 Thus, both formulating and carrying out 
“programs for transition . . . should be undertaken by the responsible 
school authorities under the supervision of the courts of first 
instance.”147 And finally, “[t]he cases should be remanded . . . with 
directions to carry out this Court’s decision as rapidly as the 
particular circumstances permit.”148
The essence of this brief’s argument can be found in the 
Government’s answers to the questions posted by the Court: 
4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in public schools violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment 
(a) would a decree necessarily follow providing that, within the limits set 
by normal geographic school districting, Negro children should forthwith 
be admitted to schools of their choice? No. 
(b) or may this Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, permit an 
effective gradual adjustment to be brought about from existing segregated 
systems to a system not based on color distinctions? Yes.149
Neither the Court in its eventual opinion nor the Government in 
its brief in Brown II felt it necessary to cite authority to support the 
Court’s power to fashion relief.150 The Government merely 
concluded that the Court could draw on a “breadth and flexibility of 
judicial remedies.”151 Moreover, the brief emphasized that “all will 
agree” that the “shaping of appropriate relief in the present cases . . . 
involves considerations of a most sensitive and difficult nature.”152  
The brief recognized that because of their ages, the “personal 
and present” rights of the schoolchildren involved in the consolidated 
cases might be lost if the remedy was delayed.153 “Hence any delay in 
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granting relief is pro tanto an irretrievable loss of the right.”154 But 
the brief suggested that in fashioning relief, the Court “always” faces 
a similar question, the question of how best to remove “the condition 
of illegality” in a way that respects not only the interests of the 
aggrieved parties, but also the public interest.155 And when “the 
scales are not so clearly tipped” in the direction of entering a decree 
enjoining the unlawful conduct, the shaping of the remedy “involves 
difficulties.”156
On the one hand, the Government acknowledged, “[W]e are
dealing here with basic constitutional rights, and not merely those of 
a few children but of millions.”157 So unless there are “compelling 
reasons to the contrary,” “there should be no unnecessary delay.”158
Still, on the other hand, the Government presented an opposing 
“public interest” as seen from an “objective examination of the 
problems of relief.”159 The public interest (in opposition to ordering 
immediate relief) was implicated because Brown I “requires the 
termination of segregation in school systems in more than one-third 
of the States and the District of Columbia,” and “the systems of 
public education . . . should not be adversely affected.”160
Finally, in a section Elman later attributed to President Dwight 
Eisenhower,161 the brief expressed even-handed empathy,
encouraging the Court to be concerned not only for the 
schoolchildren attending segregated schools but also for those 
undergoing “alterations” in the transition to desegregation.162 As the 
brief put it: “[R]acial segregation in public schools is not a separate 
and distinct phenomenon. It is part of a larger social pattern of racial 
relationships.”163 The Court should take into consideration the 
feelings of all those affected by the decision because the Court’s
decision in Brown I had 
outlawed a social institution which has existed for a long time in many 
areas throughout the country—an institution, it may be noted, which 
during its existence not only has had the sanction of decisions of this court 
                                                     
154. Id. (emphasis omitted).  
155. Id. at *4.  
156. Id. at *4-5.  
157. Id. at *5.  
158. Id. at *6.  
159. Id.
160. Id. at *6-7.  
161. ELMAN ORAL HISTORY, supra note 7, at 221-22. 
162. Brief for the United States on Questions of Relief, supra note 114, at 8.  
163. Id. at 7. 
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but has been fervently supported by great numbers of people as justifiable 
on legal and moral grounds.164  
The brief pointed to the Court’s earlier recognition of the 
psychological and emotional impact on schoolchildren of attending 
separate schools. Similar psychological and emotional forces would 
affect the school districts and community members now faced with 
the change to desegregation. “In similar fashion, psychological and 
emotional factors are involved—and must be met with understanding 
and good will—in the alterations that must now take place in order to 
bring about compliance with the Court’s decision.”165 Thus, this 
paragraph concluded, the Court, “in determining the most effective 
means for ending school segregation in particular areas,” should take 
into account “[t]he practical difficulties which may be met in 
effecting transition to nonsegregated public school systems.”166
In the next section, the Government brief elaborated on the 
kinds of problems that might affect the transition, listing a series of 
benign and mundane causes. First, the administration and delivery of 
educational services is greatly decentralized across the United States, 
including more than 70,000 school districts, with numerous agencies 
sharing authority. Next, because of the discretion given local school 
authorities, no two districts will face the same problems. These 
problems will include allocating students among schools, adjusting 
the use of school facilities, reassignment of teachers, and 
accommodation of transportation needs. Similarly, the economic 
costs and solutions will fall upon many different layers of 
government. Only at the end did the Government acknowledge the 
concern of widespread community resistance. Finally, “school 
authorities may have to cope with a certain amount of popular 
hostility towards the elimination of segregation in public schools.”167
This hostility will come about because “the dual system has existed 
for generations and is accepted by many as a ‘way of life.’”168 And 
even though “general community hostility cannot serve as 
justification for avoiding or postponing compliance,” the Court 
should nevertheless consider it as “relevant in determining the most 
effective method for ending segregation in the particular locality.”169
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Because local needs and conditions varied so widely, the 
Government brief argued that local school authorities should be 
responsible for creating, initiating, and supervising programs of 
desegregation.170 Perhaps anticipating the reaction of some school 
districts, the brief pointed out that delay would nonetheless not be 
justifiable where the defendants could not show that immediate 
completion of the desegregation program is impracticable.171
Unlike the Government’s earlier interpretations of the 
Fourteenth Amendment as providing affirmative guarantees of 
equality, the brief in Brown II was restricted to the prohibitory claim. 
In other words, the Constitution prohibits the maintenance of 
segregated school system by requiring that school districts end racial 
classifications: “The decisive inquiry is whether race or color has 
been entirely eliminated as a criterion in the admission of pupils to 
public schools.”172 And, in marked contrast with the language of its 
earlier briefs insisting that the principle of equal rights under the law 
should prevail, this Government brief expressed its hope that 
Americans will act in the spirit of “patience without compromise of 
principle.”173
V. JUDGING THE BRIEFS 
Not only does the past inform the present case, but the 
decision in the present case changes the past.174
In Fisher’s view, when we choose among stories, we rely on 
our inherent sense of their probability (how well do they hang 
together?) and fidelity (do they ring true?).175 Probability is an 
internal assessment of whether the story is coherent and complete 
and whether the characters behave in consistent ways. Fidelity is an 
assessment of how reliable and faithful the story is to our vision of 
how the world works. Fidelity to a world most of us would like to 
live in can be seen in the near-iconic status of Brown I: “Brown fits 
nicely into a widely held and often repeated story about America and 
its Constitution. This story has such deep resonance in American 
culture that we may justly regard it as the country’s national 
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narrative . . . the Great Progressive Narrative.”176 In this story, despite 
setbacks, the Constitution reflects America’s deepest ideals, America 
has been striving to meet these ideals since its founding, and they are 
“gradually [being] realized through historical struggle and acts of 
great political courage.”177
A. The Judgment of the Court  
Concluding in Brown I that segregation itself deprives children 
of equal educational opportunities178 because “[s]eparate educational 
facilities are inherently unequal,” the Supreme Court overturned 
Plessy and ruled that the states had denied the plaintiffs the equal
protection of the law.179 Chief Justice Warren’s short opinion for the 
unanimous Court explained the decision almost entirely in terms of 
the ethos-based equality rationale. He frankly acknowledged that the 
history of the Fourteenth Amendment—which had been the subject 
of extensive reargument and re-briefing—was at best inconclusive. 
Because of the relatively undeveloped status of public education at 
the time of the adoption of the Fourteen Amendment, it was even 
more difficult to discern the intended effect of the Fourteenth 
Amendment on public education.180
As for doctrinal arguments, Chief Justice Warren minimized 
the influence of the existing precedent. Of the six prior cases the 
Supreme Court had decided involving the separate but equal doctrine 
in public education, two had not involved the validity of the doctrine 
itself, while the more recent cases at the graduate or professional 
school level could be said to have found that because inequality 
existed, it was unnecessary to re-examine Plessy.181 In contrast, 
several of the cases consolidated in Brown were based on lower court 
findings that the segregated schools were equal. The Court was 
therefore required to address “the effect of segregation itself on 
public education . . . in the light of its full development and its 
present place in American life.”182 Here, Chief Justice Warren turned 
to the policy argument advanced by the NAACP and backed by 
psychological research. Quoting the Kansas court’s finding that 
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segregation has a detrimental effect upon black children, Chief 
Justice Warren concluded that segregated schools could not provide 
equal educational opportunities.183
In Brown II, the Supreme Court accepted the Government’s
argument favoring gradualism in pursuit of a remedy.184 For the 
schoolchildren’s advocates, this was a profound disappointment: 
“The NAACP lawyers who litigated both Brown cases certainly 
understood the potentially devastating effect of ‘all deliberate 
speed.’”185 In their brief filed in 1954, they had argued that the 
resisting school districts had an affirmative burden to “state 
explicitly what they propose and to establish that the requested 
postponement has judicially cognizable advantages greater than 
those inherent in the prompt vindication of appellants’ adjudicated 
constitutional rights.”186 The NAACP lawyers had found “no case
where this Court has found a violation of a present constitutional 
right but has postponed relief on the representation by governmental 
officials that local mores and customs justify delay which might 
produce a more orderly transition.”187 How harmful if the Court were 
to decide for the first time in Brown “that constitutional rights may 
be postponed because of anticipation of difficulties arising out of 
local feelings.”188 This would be a particularly inappropriate result 
because these challenges to elementary school segregation had been 
brought especially “to vindicate rights which, as a matter of common 
knowledge and legal experience, need, above all others, protection 
against local attitudes and patterns of behavior.”189 For reasons that 
have been discussed in many sources and will not be repeated here,
the Court accepted the Government’s argument, and Chief Justice 
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Warren then incorporated all deliberate speed in his 1954 opinion 
for the Court.190
B. The Judgment of Narrative Rationality 
Like all stories, legal briefs and opinions make claims to 
knowledge, truth, and reality. Fisher’s principles of narrative 
probability and fidelity provide a perspective for judging the stories 
contained in the Government’s briefs. This judgment of narrative 
rationality is based on examining the themes and values of the 
message, the character of the messenger, and the resulting reliability, 
trustworthiness, and desirability of the message.191
The first quality of narrative probability, whether the story 
hangs together, is assessed in terms of its argumentative or structural 
coherence; its material coherence (a story that is internally consistent 
may fail this test if it omits important facts or ignores issues and 
counterarguments); and the coherence of its characters. As Fisher 
explains this last element, “Whether or not a story is believable 
depends on the reliability of characters, both as narrators and as 
actors.”192 To determine character, we interpret a person’s decisions 
and actions as reflecting the person’s values. If the values underlying 
the character’s decisions and actions tend to “contradict one another, 
change significantly, or alter in ‘strange’ ways, the result is a 
questioning of character.”193 To achieve the narrative quality of 
coherence, “characters [must] behave characteristically.”194
Taken one by one, as they were filed, each of the 
Government’s briefs (in Brown I, Brown I on reargument, and 
Brown II) almost certainly meets the test of argumentative or 
structural coherence. Written by experienced and expert brief 
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writers, each brief is logically arranged and follows a familiar 
argument structure. As for material coherence, each brief contains 
essential law and facts as well as backup arguments and rebuttals to 
counterarguments. There are no gaps or surprises, and the expected 
elements and answers are easily located. Thus, the Government brief 
in Brown I begins by advancing the structural or prudential argument 
that there was an alternative route, that is, the Court need not decide 
in this case to overrule precedent. But the brief goes on to support in 
depth its essential argument: that equality principles are well 
established in the American ethos and that those principles compel 
the conclusion that Plessy should be overruled. As requested, the 
brief on reargument in Brown I contains the necessary and expected 
elements; having been asked to address the history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the brief focuses on that history before returning to its 
themes that Plessy should be overruled and introducing a stronger 
argument that caution should be taken with the remedy. Finally, in 
Brown II, again filed in response to the specific request of the Court, 
the Government’s brief is internally consistent, and it omits none of 
the expected arguments. From the advocate’s point of view, each 
brief is structurally and materially coherent—each brief hangs 
together.  
Once the Government’s briefs are viewed together, some issues 
arise as to their coherence. The almost-exclusive emphasis in the 
Brown II brief on the need to move slowly and gradually is jarring 
when viewed within the context of the strongly stated equality 
arguments in the first Government brief. Even in the third brief, the 
Government briefly and emphatically restates the earlier point that 
“[t]he right of children not to be segregated because of race or color 
is not a technical legal right of little significance or value. It is a 
fundamental human right, supported by considerations of morality as 
well as law.”195
Other incongruities and inconsistencies in the structure and 
content of the Government briefs, viewed together, include the 
disconnect between the argument, running consistently through all 
the Government’s briefs, that segregated schools violate a personal 
and present right of children and the concept, expressed at length in 
the third brief, that there is an offsetting public interest to be taken 
into account. Similarly, the early vision of Americans as ethical and 
courageous people who have embraced broad equality principles is 
in conflict with the final brief’s recognition of implacable hostility in 
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the communities that will be told to integrate. That inconsistency is 
underlined by the brief’s claim that the Court should weigh equally 
the emotional and psychological factors affecting both the children 
and those resisting desegregation. 
From Fisher’s perspective, even more important to the 
judgment based on narrative probability is the conclusion that the 
Government’s briefs—taken as a whole—fail the test of portraying
reliable characters. The state and federal government actors depicted 
in the stories told by the Government’s briefs—as well as the authors 
of those briefs—do not act characteristically. Sometimes they are 
courageous and vigilant; at other times they are cautious and fearful. 
In other words, these characters cannot be relied upon.196 Outside the 
briefs themselves, the test of character faces another challenge, that 
of the reliability of the narrator. According to Elman, he had ongoing 
private conversations with Justice Frankfurter (for whom he had 
clerked) during the time he was working on the civil rights cases. 
Elman contended that this was proper because he did not consider 
himself a lawyer for a litigant: “I considered it a cause that 
transcended ordinary notions about propriety in litigation.”197
Elman’s status as an unreliable narrator seems further demonstrated 
by the Government’s assertion that rather than an argument, it was 
providing an objective viewpoint or was engaged in an objective 
non-adversary discussion.  
To assess the second quality, narrative fidelity, the briefs are 
“viewed as composed of good reasons, elements that give warrants 
for believing or acting in accord with the message fostered by that 
text.”198 Good reasons in the Fisher sense may be expressed in many 
different forms, ranging from syllogistic arguments to metaphors and 
analogies as well as everyday stories and long-enduring myths. Chris 
Rideout describes the important role that audience plays in 
determining what is a good reason: “[W]hether a story constitutes 
good reasons for belief or action is a matter of how willing an 
audience is to adhere to the story.”199
Looking at the Government’s briefs from this perspective of 
narrative fidelity, we look for good reasons both in the form of 
specific categories of argument accepted within the field and in the 
form of identifiable values and beliefs held by the assumed audience 
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(here, the Supreme Court given the job of interpreting the 
constitutional guarantees).200 Translating the reasons that constitute 
the Government’s stories into the language of Bobbitt’s archetypes,
the Government’s brief in Brown I is constructed on a strong ethical 
framework (buttressed by doctrinal and policy support asserted more 
particularly in the NAACP brief), while the historical argument 
contained in Brown I on reargument carries little weight. In 
Brown II, both reasons and values are overwhelmingly devoted to 
supporting the Court’s inclination for delay. Hardly any doctrinal 
framework supports the brief’s claim that the Court may structure 
relief as the brief suggested.  
Instead of balanced or reinforcing argument modalities, the 
Government’s brief in Brown II is constructed almost exclusively 
upon prudential arguments, stated in the conventional forms of 
policy arguments. These are based on social, political, cultural, and 
economic circumstances. They weigh the costs and benefits; they 
look at the consequences of the decision; they suggest judgments 
about whether certain actions will achieve their object. Some appear 
to be a blend of structural–prudential argument, for example, the 
argument that the Court is not as well suited to make particular 
decisions as the local school districts are.  
Looking only at Brown I, the good reasons in the 
Government’s brief match up with those in the Court’s opinion: The 
basis of both is the ethical framework stated consistently by the 
Government as early as the Shelley amicus brief. Judging the same 
category of good reasons as expressed in the Government’s brief in 
Brown II, however, the countervailing weight of the NAACP brief’s 
ethical arguments is simply too much for the Government’s 
prudential arguments to bear.  
As for narrative fidelity’s weighing of values, Fisher suggests 
that “the values of technical precision are not as important as the 
values of overall coherence, truthfulness, wisdom and humane 
action.”201 The stories told in the Government’s briefs start out as 
fully informed by shared values of equality under the law and the 
Government’s affirmative and courageous role as a protector of the 
rights of citizens. They move on to the values of prudence, 
practicality, caution, and moderation as well as need for local control
and modest governance. Even though these latter values may not be 
entirely coherent, consistent, or true to the values we aspire to, many 
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aspects of the Government’s stories are true to the way we actually 
live our lives. So it cannot be said that their briefs are wholly lacking 
in the quality of narrative fidelity.  
In the end, the Government’s briefs in Brown I and Brown II
tried to have it all: an end to the reported deadlock among the 
Supreme Court justices, an uplifting outcome with minimum 
upheaval. Yet, as Fisher points out in his analysis of the argument 
between Socrates and Callicles, when we try to live according to 
conflicting myths, the best we can achieve is a kind of 
schizophrenia.202
CONCLUSION
“This is not a story to pass on.”203
Brown I established the framework for the arguments we 
continue to make about equality and race, both within and outside 
the courts. Like the Supreme Court in Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, we still draw 
upon the stories we find in Brown I and the stories we tell about 
Brown I. 
Beyond the frame of advocacy, Brown I established a “deep 
connection between the Constitution, the Rule of Law, and equal 
citizenship [that] has become an article of faith in the American civic 
religion.”204 Despite enduring disagreement about what the opinion 
means, Brown I has shaped common understanding and civil rights 
policy for more than fifty years. Its status is such that “[n]o federal 
judicial nominee and no mainstream national politician today would 
dare suggest that Brown was wrongly decided.”205
As one NAACP lawyer recalled its effect on America’s social 
and cultural development, “Brown cracked open [a] frozen sea. It 
changed minds and rules, challenged hierarchical assumptions, 
stimulated a social movement that became political, enlisted parts of 
the country and the world.”206 Although massive resistance followed 
Brown II, the U.S. government was eventually able to suppress 
physical resistance, and federal legislation was enacted to carry out 
the vision of equality under the law.  
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In political and judicial circles, Brown became “a symbol of 
what courts devoted to justice could achieve if they had the 
necessary will and courage.” Brown represented a radically changed 
view of the role of the judiciary, one in which the Court would be 
seen as the central source of authority for interpreting the 
Constitution and, in the process, for elevating public values above 
private interests.207
The decisions rendered in Brown I and other civil rights cases 
marked the beginning of a period in which the Court increasingly 
found ethical grounds for expanding the reach of constitutional 
rights. The decisions in Brown and Bolling opened the door to more 
such claims:  
Not only were the briefs strongly [in favor of the model of the living 
Constitution], but the Court’s opinions were exclusively so. That the 
Court’s greatest and most legitimate constitutional decisions were 
rendered with no originalist support—and wide belief that original intent 
supported Plessy—called forth a generation of relatively open 
constitutional dynamism.208  
For a time at least, the result would be to expand protections against 
state discrimination on the basis of racial classifications and also to
encourage lawyers to seek greater recognition of the rights of women 
and LGBT Americans. 
How might narrative and metaphor enrich our understanding of 
the work done by persuasive lawyers in civil rights advocacy? 
Fisher’s narrative paradigm offers guidelines that will help in the 
“determination of whether or not a given instance of discourse 
provides a reliable, trustworthy, and desirable guide to thought and 
action in the world.”209 In Fisher’s view, briefs can be judged in the 
same way that we choose among stories, and we choose among 
stories based on whether they “‘ring true’ to life as we would like to 
live it.”210 As we choose among stories, we assess reasons, values, 
and characters: Who are the heroes and who are the villains? With 
what “morals of the story” do we wish to be identified?211
Analogous guidelines can be found in Black’s metaphor theory. 
According to Black, strong metaphors, that is ones that are emphatic 
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and resonant,212 create meaning. Once she has heard a strong 
metaphor, the listener perceives connections. Once those connections 
are seen, they are actually present. As a result, emphatic and resonant 
metaphors generate insight and understanding.213  
The color-blind Constitution and all deliberate speed have 
become metaphorical stand-ins for complex and evolving concepts. 
The color-blind Constitution began as an emphatic and resonant 
metaphor capable of creating meaning. From the start, all deliberate 
speed was a purposefully weak metaphor, chosen for its ability to 
cloud and obscure. As Justice Hugo Black pointed out fifteen years 
after Brown, “‘all deliberate speed’ has turned out to be only a soft 
euphemism for delay.”214
Is there a real, qualitative difference between the Government’s
briefs and those filed on behalf of the schoolchildren in Brown I and 
Brown II? The narrative and metaphor theories applied here provide 
only guidelines for further conversation, not final judgments. So the 
answer may depend on whether we join Fisher in viewing the world 
as “a set of stories [and images] which must be chosen among to live 
the good life in a process of continual recreation.”215
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